Ethicists often distinguish moral objects from moral agents . Moral objets are those things whose preferences, interests, rights and so on should be taken into consideration in our moral deliberations, while moral agents are those things which can properly be held morally responsible (praised, blamed and so on) for their decisions and actions. Ethicists disagree about exactly which things fall into which category, but most agree that not all moral objects are moral agents. My infant niece, Evelyn, is a good example. Evelyn's interests in health, food and safety should surely be taken into account when I am deciding how to act, but it's also clear that she is not (yet) to be held morally responsible for her actions. Peter Singer, Tom Regan and other moral philosophers who argue against speciesism hold, in effect, that sentient non-human animals are moral objects, even though very few (if any) are moral agents. But holding that a pig's interests should be taken into consideration even though it is...

We might hold that the moral status of a given action-type depends upon the circumstances in which it occurs. So, knocking your opponent over might be entirely permissible on the football field, but not in a presidential debate. Some have held that lying is permissible in some circumstances (the "white lie") but not in others. This doctrine is "relativistic" in the sense that the status of an action-type is held to be "relative to" the different circumstances in which it occurs. But this is not the sense people have in mind when they talk of moral relativism . That view generally allows that the moral status of a particular, datable action-token (or an action-type in which all morally relevant contingent circumstances are specified) might depend upon the views of the individual evaluating that action, or upon the contingent norms of her culture. (Moral relativism takes a variety of forms.) As a moral relativist, I might say that infidelity--even a particular act of infidelity--is wrong for me, but...

The types of dilemma you mention are good starting points for a positive moral theory. Our pre-reflective moral practice contains elements (rules of thumb, behavioral inclinations, moral intuitions and so on) that pull us in different directions in such cases; and a considered moral theory must somehow resolve such tensions if it is to be consistent. But what type of resolution is required? Suppose that we've arrived at a theoretical resolution to one of your dilemmas. For example, we decide that, on reflection, it is impermissible to inflict unnecessary suffering on sentient beings. (A full moral theory will have to contain much more than just this one principle; and I'm not, in any case, advocating this one (though it seems right to me).) This principle would rule out the eating of factory farmed animals, but not all abortions--for example, the many abortions that (a) do not involve a sentient being (as opposed to a potentiallly sentient being) or (b) might greatly decrease overall suffering (on the...

Dear C, Causal responsibility or moral responsibility? Causal: Yes, A's actions were crucial in the causal-chain that brought about C's harm; were it not for A's actions, C (probably) would not have been harmed by B in that way. Moral: No, at least not as you've described things. A didn't wish or intend any harm to C, and, indeed, reasonably thought that bringing B and C together would be mutually beneficial. Too bad B turned out to be a bad egg, but that's not A's (moral) fault. Upshot: Moral responsibility implies causal responsiblity, but not vice versa. (Well, this case establishes the "not vice versa" part.) No doubt some clever philosopher will try to refute all that I've just demonstrated, but don't believe her. I am off the hook. Beneficently yours, A

That's an interesting question. Certainly we don't begrudge a person advocating a position she may not support when it's her role to advocate this position. I'm thinking here of lawyers and certain members of government. However, in these cases the idea (though perhaps not the reality) is that truth and overall goodness will be achieved through a general process or system of advocacy. (Also, in such cases, arguments aren't put forth in the author's name alone, but rather on behalf of a client or agency.) One might argue that non-fiction can sometimes be part of a similar system--so that there's some good in throwing out proposals, suggestions and arguments one may not endorse in order that they be digested by a process that will, precisely through grappling with a variety of positions, arrive at a more comprehensive, nuanced and accurate view of reallity. (In certain moments I view professional philosophy in this way.) But these cases seem exceptional to me. Even when the system allows it, the...

By my lights, both you and the vet did exactly the right things. You initially helped the bird help itself (by putting it out of harm's way), and then, when that seemed insufficient, took it to a place where you thought it could get medical attention. In my view, the vet also did the right thing in euthanizing the gull on his or her considered judgment that any other course of action would result in much greater suffering. Your qualms seem really to be with euthanasia, and your role in enabling it. One question to ask is how you think the gull (or the world) would have been better had the the gull not been euthanized, but rather left, in all likelihood, to die much more painfully a few days later. Many would argue that the euthanasia maximized the quality if not the length of the gull's life. The gull may have died more naturally and with more dignity if let be, but this is debatable I think, and in any case difficult to weigh against the much greater suffering. We have to be careful here to strip away...

Philosophy has much to say about this type of distinction, though I doubt I'm the one to say it. Nevertheless... It seems quite right to distinguish between the normative or prescriptive question of what the ends or even choices of an individual or institution ought to be, and the descriptive question of what, as a matter of fact, they were or are likely to be in a particular case. Moreover, it's important, as the books emphasize, to keep these different questions in mind as one assesses proposals, explanations and theories. I might predict that you will come to financial ruin because of a strong preference (e.g., for expensive wines) which I don't think you should have, or a series of choices (e.g., to invest in junk-bonds) which I don't think you should make. And I might argue that the government should raise taxes even though I predict it won't, and even though I doubt its policy leaders share the crucial assumptions that ground my normative view. So the distinction between normative and the...

To be plausible, all of your claims about imagination need to be qualified as "other things being equal", since there are, of course, examples of vivid imagination leading to terrible (and destructive and intolerant) actions. This said, I'm inclined to agree to most of the general claims you make for imagination. And in fact, we've just embarked our daughter on a Waldorf education that emphasizes the development of imagination, and all the benefits that this supposedly brings. However, to really assess all of this, we'd need a somewhat detailed account of what exactly counts as imagination (and greater or lesser amounts of it), and some tests to determine whether it links up in positive ways with the other properties you've identified. This task is partly philosophical, but mostly, I think, a matter for empirical psychology. It's an interesting topic, though. Sorry I don't have more to add.

If two wrongs don't make a right, try a third. I think Nixon said that. But he wasn't the most reliable ethicist, and I can't think of a sitauation in which two wrongs would make a right. A just punishment might seem to come close, but doesn't really: the score may be settled when you've served your time, but your original crime isn't thereby made right (even though it's forgiven); and the sentence you served wasn't a second wrong anyway.

Philosophy might help in sifting through the possible reasons for conserving biodiversity--not just diversity of species, but also of types of ecosystems and also, perhaps, of genetic diversity within a species. And what is worrying about our current situation, by the way, is not simply that species are going extinct (this has always happened), but that diversity is disappearing at an alarming rate and on an alarming scale--one that is perhaps comparable to the five or so mass extinctions that have taken place over the past 440 million years. And we seem to be causing it! There are surely a number of very good instrumental reasons for preserving biodiversity. First, in biodiversity lies a treasure chest of potential medicines, foods, and other things that might be useful to us. Second, we don't want to lose clues to a more complete understanding of the workings and history of the Earth. Third, for many of us, even non-religious types, the diversity of life is a deep and awesome source of aesthetic and...