I think that Allen gives some good practical advice and that Eric discusses well some important bureaucratic/administrative challenges that you would face even if the strategy that Allen lays out went swimmingly. My answer, however, builds on a point that Oliver made. First, I agree with Oliver that earning degrees in philosophy might be useful for reasons that your question does not address. Reflecting on--and growing from--one's experience as a student at various levels is extremely important for a successful academic career, and so your lack of that experience constitutes another significant challenge. This long process of education also serves to test your skills and passions (Are you really as good as philosophy as you think? Is your passion deep-seated and strong enough?) and to hone them -- I would think even a philosophical genius would grow significantly by working through high-quality degree programs. Second, I have a practical suggestion. You describe yourself as young but located in a...

There are many ways to answer this question, and hopefully panelists with specialized knowledge of Wittgenstein and the history of 20th Century philosophy will chime in with more specific details. From my position as an interested reader of Wittgenstein, two things stand out: (1) the beauty and blazingly-hot insight of his Tractarian system, and especially his version of the picture theory of meaning and his use of the concept of logical form; (2) the thorough-going critique of his own earlier views in the Investigations and other works. So, I disagree that Wittgenstein's writing is marked by vagueness -- his writing style is eccentric, to be sure, but I consider it really engaging and insightful, and I consider the Tractatus one of the greatest systematic works of philosophy of the 20th Century. In addition, I find Wittgenstein's willingness to critique himself and revise his views so forcefully--and also with so much insight--to symbolize an aspect of philosophical inquiry that I value...

I think the more interesting question is what makes wildlyimplausible conspiracy theories seem plausible to so many. I think that part ofthe problem is that it takes some specialized training to be able to compute probabilitiesaccurately, and most without that training tend to overestimate how likely itis that a complicated conspiracy really occurred, and I think that part of the problemis that many do not have adequate accounts of how one event might or might notexplain another. I don’t think, however, that these “philosophical” issueswhy so many find those implausible theories highly intriguing – I imagine thereis are interesting sociological , psychological, and political explanation forthis, and I hope that other panelists may be able to say more.

I agree with Thomas that it would be nice if we could identify multiple forms of government that can handle these ecological issues -- it would be much better to be able to make comparative assessments of those forms of governments and their capacities and legitimacies than to contemplate, say, the prospect that no existing form of government may be able to handle these crises or that no combination of current governments may be able to work effectively together to tackle them in concert. But does our ability to assess the impact, if any, of those crises no the legitimacy of our government depends on knowing that "another, non-democratic form of government" has the capacity and realistic prospects to address those issues? On the one hand, knowledge of that sort could cause us to create a comparative assessment on which the urgency and significance of those crises makes that non-democratic form of government preferable to our own. Whether or not that sort of comparison could also motivate an...

Other historical figures who write on these themes are Plato,Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Mill. Many of thesethinkers discussed together in intriguing ways private property rightsand the value of work, and I think that Marx's arguments bearinteresting relations to, for example, Locke's and Hegel's views onthat. After Marx, Dewey and Arendt wrote on the large theme you nameas do many contemporary philosophers working in the fields of politicalphilosophy, feminist philosophy, business ethics, and environmentalethics -- probably any large-scale anthology of recent work in thosefields will include some relevant material. Marx's views aren't discussed as much these days as they were, say, in the late 1970s and 1980s whenGerry Cohen, John Roemer, Tom Bottomore, Alexander Callinicos, andothers did much high-quality work in what was sometimes called"analytical Marxism." Those folks' critical work includes usefuldiscussions of how Marx's ideas on work relate to work earlier in...

One more thought: if you are interested in twentieth century analytic philosophy, Scott Soames' two-volume history provides clear and reasonably reliable interpretations of the history of some of the movements within that tradition. Even though Soames does not provide a full or completely satisfactory history of analytic philosophy--his central narrative focuses narrowly on those treatments of the analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent, and apriori/aposteriori distinctions that are most closely connected to Saul Kripke's celebrated work in Naming and Necessity , and the emphasis he places on the historical significance of Kripke's achievements creates some some significant gaps and oversimplifications--these texts are extremely engaging and reading them can be a good way to gain sophisticated introductory knowledge about some vital figures in recent philosophical history: Soames, Scott, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis . (Princeton, NJ:...

Russell's book is lively, but not that reliable. The best one-volume history of philosophy I've found is A Brief History of Western Philosophy by Anthony Kenny, which is accessible but sophisticated and concise yet comprehensive. Unlike Russell, Kenny develops develop a sophisticated historiography that draws helpfully from wider cultural and historical events and trends. This gives his text a much more interestingly nuanced view than is normal in introductory histories of philosophy. The book is entertaining and deeply informative -- and I consider it the very best of its genre! Here's an Amazon link (note -- the text I have mind is the one published by Blackwell in 1998; Kenny has published other histories of philosophy since then that I don't like as much): http://www.amazon.com/Brief-History-Western-Philosophy/dp/0631201327

It isn't clear to me exactly what sort of academic "topic" interests you the most. So, I'll consider several options. First, consider whether some academic disciplines are moredifficult than others. Given the sheer diversity of academic workwithin each of the various disciplines, I don't think there is anyprospect of ordering those disciplines by difficulty: each fieldaddresses a multitude of problems in a multitude of ways all the whileresponding to past work in more or less sophisticated ways and alsodeveloping methodological innovations, incorporating new content, etc.So, I think that professionals working within every field haveopportunities to perform extremely challenging academic work. Second, consider whether some academic courses are inherently more difficult than others. Itcertainly is the case that undergraduate students frequently considersome classes to be more difficult than others. In part, this may bereasonable: for example, many students find research methodology andstatistics...

I don't see anyphilosophical reason to conflate the conventional distinction betweenatheism and agnosticism, although I think that there exist somepolitical and social pressures to do that in contemporary Americansociety: some individuals who affirm atheism in private are morecomfortable inaccurately describing their attitude in public asagnosticism and some theists critics wrongly label both categories offailure to believe in God as atheism. There probably are interestinghistorical and sociological stories to tell about those pressures, but I don'tthink there is a compelling philosophical story about why redefiningatheism in the manner you describe is rationally required or that suggest that this would be a useful revision to make to our language. Mark's reply raises some interesting issues about human rationality. If atheists were required to have considered multiple arguments and assessed lots of evidence, then it would seem odd to describe many human beings as atheists and not just squirrels -...

A most interesting question from long ago, and two good answers! I don't know if you are interested in a more detailed response, but in case you are I'll add some more details. Please ignore if this is too much for your interests, and please understand that, as both Sean's and Douglas's responses make clear, this is difficult exegetical territory and so different critics will have different takes on this fascinating topic. First, here's my gloss on 'intuition,' drawing upon two passages on Kant's First Critique, one of which Sean quoted above: [A19/B33] Intuitions are one of two sorts of representations which we syn­thesize to form experience; they are connected with the sensibil­ity (concepts are the other sort of representation; they are con­nected with the understanding). Through intuitions, "objects are given to us by means of sensibility". Intuitions rest on "affectations": objects affect our mind in certain ways in which we are "receptive"; in us are produced "sensations" and thereby we ...

There's been lots of interesting philosophical work on punishment, including discussions that defend a retributive account of punishment and discussions that justify punishment on other grounds, for example, deterring future crime. So, if any of those defenses or justifications is correct, then, yes, punishment does serve a useful long term purpose for (depending on the exact account that is correct) the criminal, his or her victim, or the society in which he or she lives. Of the philosophical treatments of the questions you raise, I most highly recommend an Enlightenment thinker who once was widely read but, unfortunately, no longer is: Cesare Beccaria. His short book On Crimes and Punishments (1764) condemned the use of torture, argued for the abolition of capital punishment, and advocated many reforms for the rational and fair administration of law. Beccaria’s ideas about legal and penal reforms, which influenced intellectuals and statesmen throughout Europe and in North America, inspired many...