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Logic

I know a number of people who subscribe to a particular model of human development, who often use terms peculiar to this model in premises in arguments. For example, I've heard many variations on this theme: "You and/or your worldview, and thus your view on the issue we're arguing about, are at level or stage x, and because x is not as highly developed as y and me and/or my view is at y, it's obvious that your view is less than adequate [or wrong, etc.]." One could point out that the premises require support, but I've been reluctant to do that in large part because my sense is that the very use of these premises falls in the direction of being a fallacy of relevance. (I've suggested that interjecting such premises into an argument is a conversation stopper, but the term "conversation stopper" doesn't have the same weight as terms like "fallacy of relevance.") I seek clarification, suggestions, advice.

Actually, this sounds like a pretty good example of the 'question begging' fallacy. I can't just assert that 'your view is inferior/not as highly developed'. I have to provide some sort of reasonable evidence for you to think my claim that 'your view is inferior/ not as highly developed' is correct. Without such evidence I'm simply presupposing what I should be proving (this happens A LOT in our culture for some reason).
Logic

What makes an argument "good"? Is there more to a good argument than raw persuasive power? Does a good argument have to support the right conclusion? For example, might the ontological argument be a good argument for theism even if theism is false?

The term 'good' is notoriously ambiguous. However, I often tell my students that a goal for their arguments should be that an intelligent, well-informed person with no strong pre-existing opinion on the matter would find it convincing. Thus, a 'good' argument could have a conclusion that is ultimately false. And it is possible for 'good' arguments to exist for logically incompatible conclusions. Note, however, that there is more to this account of a 'good' argument than pure persuasive power... it has to be persuasive to a certain kind of person (whereas some arguments that 'persuade' the masses are not particularly convincing to the well-informed or the intelligent). As for the ontological argument, I don't think it is a good argument (in the sense above) in contemporary culture because most people would not find its premises to be more likely than its conclusion (and generally the point of an argument is to get someone to accept a conclusion based on the strength of its premises and their...
Logic
Religion

I have recently stumbled upon a short book written by the Catholic theologian named Peter Kreeft. He deductively argued for Jesus’ divinity through an approach he summarized as “Aut deus aut homo malus.” (Either God or a Bad Man.) Basically, his argument works only on the assumption made by most historians. Jesus was a teacher, he claimed divinity, and was executed. So, assuming this is true he says Jesus must’ve been one of three things. One possibility is that he was a liar. He said he was divine even though he knew it was not true. Another possibility is that he was insane. He believed he was divine even though he wasn’t. The final possibility is that he was telling the truth and he was correct. He was divine. He goes through and points out that Jesus shows no symptoms of insanity. He had no motive for lying. In fact, he was executed because of his claims. That gives him a motive to deny his divinity, which he apparently was given a chance to do by according to the Jewish and Roman sources on the...

Thanks to Charles Taliaferro for resurrecting this interesting question (which I was too swamped to answer when it came around the first time). It is important to remember that like many philosophical arguments it has a specific audience in mind. Let's call the intended audience 'the agnostic gentleman' in these two senses: first, the intended audience is genuinely agnostic in that he/she really believes that miracles and the incarnation are possibilities with a reasonable probability of being true. The intended audience does not have a strong commitment to naturalism or standing opinion against the possibility of miracles. Second, the intended audience is a 'gentleman' in the sense that he/she really wants to hold an unambiguously positive view of Jesus so the 'liar' and 'lunatic' options of the 'trilemma' will not be attractive to him/her. For someone holding the two previous commitments, the argument can be quite effective. The initial questioner's error was in assuming that no one would find...
Ethics
Logic

I have always been more talented at exposing flaws in reasoning or hypocrisy in actions than in constructing anything to replace what I criticize. Naturally many people are bothered when they're criticized and aggravated beyond that when not presented with an alternative. What is the status of this ability? Should someone hold his silence if he has nothing better to offer, or is just being critical worthy by itself?

It strikes me as very 'Socratic' to expose flaws in reasoning even if you don't have claims of your own to make. However, we should also remember that things didn't end well for Socrates (at least not by conventional measures.... I sometimes joke that Socrates was the first person in history that was executed mostly for being annoying). More seriously, it is important to remember that relationships are valuable and in many cases it isn't worth alienating friends over minor flaws in reasoning.
Ethics
Logic

I've noticed, perhaps incorrectly, that many philosophers and ethicists regard logical coherence as an integral component of forming and defending moral positions. While I can understand why logical coherence would be necessary for, say, a scientist who is trying to describe how something works, I do not seem to see why logical coherence would be needed for ethics -- where, presumably, there are no objectively right or wrong answers.

Your final assertion is where you disagree with most ethicists. Most of us still believe that there is something approximating 'objectively right and wrong answers' to moral questions. Ethicists disagree with one another concerning what the proper basis is for discerning objective right moral answers, but the overwhelming majority of ethicists still think such a basis can be found from sources such as: maximizing the good for all (utilitarianism), reason itself (Kantianism), some sort of ideal human character traits (Aristotelian ethics), or natural law (Thomism). Your view seems to descend from David Hume's account that based morality in the sentiments rather than reason. Yet, even he thought there was a discernable pattern to what the sentiments approved of as 'virtuous'. In any case, no one ever solved a difficult problem in ethics, science, math, or any other aspect of life by presupposing that there were no 'right or wrong answers'. There may be few answers that we can get universal...
Logic
Religion

Referring to questions 2715, 2740 and 2746 on this site. The respondents to the mentioned questions (Allen Stairs, Peter Smith and Nicholas D. Smith) seem to concur that an omnipotent God need not be able to perform a dialectical task. This idea seems to presuppose that God is subject to (under) the order of the universe and that there is little or no ontological distance between God and creation. The problem with this view is that it seems to make God determined by his own law. If we should increase the ontological distance between God and creation, whereby placing God above (not subject to) his law, it would also be problematic because it seems to make God whimsical and untrustworthy. My question: Is it correct to think that issues about the relationship between God, law and creation (and the normative implications thereof) is what underlies the questions of the type “Can God make a rock that is too heavy to pick up”? Greetings, from South Africa

There is a long theistic tradition in philosophy that agrees that being ‘omnipotent’ and ‘being able to do absolutely anything’ are two very different concepts. Calling God ‘omnipotent’ only means that God has an infinite amount of power… however, they may be things God can’t do for reasons other than a lack of power. For example, Thomas Aquinas, one of the most influential theists in history lists a large number of things that ‘God can’t do’. [In my philosophy of religion course I call this lecture ’20 things you can do that God himself couldn’t do’]. For example, Aquinas thinks God can’t change because he is already perfect… therefore he can’t become more perfect and he wouldn’t choose to become less perfect. God can’t forget or become tired. God can’t be sorry (because he never does anything wrong to be sorry for). God can’t do wrong… etc. [you can read about this in Summa Contra Gentiles I by Aquinas] Now your interest seems to focus on the question ‘can God break the rules of logic?’...