Ethics

When people speak of "morality", why does it always stem from a divine being? Why can't morality stem from reason?

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When people speak of morality, does it "always" stem from a divinebeing? That may be the prevailing sentiment in certain quarters, butthere is a long and distinguished history of philosophers (many of themdevout believers) who have argued that morality couldn't derive its authority from God.

Professor Gentzler has already directed you to Professor Brink'sanswer, but here is another way of looking at the problem. Consider theclaim that killing is wrong because God forbids it in the SixthCommandment. In order for God's command to create a genuine moralobligation (in this case, the obligation not to kill), God must possessa certain authority. (Otherwise anyone could issue commandsand thereby create moral obligations!) But now the question immediatelyarises: whence comes this authority? God cannot establish his authoritythrough another command, since he must already have authorityin order for his commands to establish anything. Thus it seems thatGod's authority must come from somewhere else. There must, in otherwords, be a standard of moral authority that is independent of God'swill.

I've often wondered whether anyone actually thinks that God's authority establishes moral principles. Of course, people say so. But when one asks such people why we ought to conform our behavior with the Divine Pronouncements, the answer, if it isn't to concede a moral standard independent of God's will, is usually that, otherwise, one will be cast into darkness with wailing and gnashing of teeth. But if so, then these aren't moral principles at all. They are arbitrary rules enforced through violence and fear.

To say so isn't to say that, for a believer, God need have nothing to do with morality. That God isn't the source of moral principles doesn't imply that God isn't an authority on moral truth in the sense that someone can be an authority on, say, mathematics. (Interesting ambiguity there.) It does imply, however, that if it is wrong to covet one's neighbor's ass, then there has to be a reason other than God's saying so that it's wrong to covet one's neighbor's ass.

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