As Question 2110 makes clear, the value of studying philosophy extends far beyond "career-oriented" preparation. Iwould also emphasize, however, that studying philosophy constitutes extremely strong preparation for many careers because itprovides you with superb opportunities for skill development, includinganalytical and creative thinking skills, analytical and creative oral and written communication skills, and, more generally, skills related to self-directed learning. Theseare extremely valuable skills in business and in other professions, and, since you also enjoy studying philosophy for its own sake, it strikes methat you have a lot to gain by working in this field. To be sure,every college course and each subject of study claims to contribute tocritical thinking and communication skills, and to some extent this istrue. Perhaps, therefore, it is mainly my own parochialism that leadsme to assert the following, although I do not think so: Workingintensively in philosophy is a...

One reading strategy that was taught to me when I first began studying philosophy as an undergraduate, and which has served me well since, is to read slowly enough that you can paraphrase the key point of each paragraph or other "chunk" of text -- the idea is not to rush ahead until you have had time to understand and think hard about what you have already read. If you do this, you will never read quickly -- but this style of slow careful attention is a great way to engage well in a philosophical text, a mathematical proof, or a complex poem. In my experience, reading Derrida in this way is more constructie than skimming his texts quickly. Finally, the way you are "supposed" to read any text depends on your own goals -- this slow, laborious strategy is best for texts that you have already decided are worth serious investments of your time and attention. So, I recommend it in this case only if you have alerady decided that engaging intensively in one of Derrida's text is worth it to you.

I agree that acknowledging that "the mere possibility of doubt doesn't provide a reason for doubting" is one part of a sensible answer to your question: that (1) we aren't sure whether we can prove complete certainty that your dog--or that Allen's scrap of tin-foil--does not control the world, despite all appearances to the contrary, doesn't provide us with (2) a good reason for taking seriously what certainly looks to be an extremely remote possibility. Moreover, and as the reference to tin-foil suggests, (3) there seems something irrational about taking those doubts too seriously. But why do possibilities like these seem easy to ignore or even to dismiss as "crazy thoughts"? Is this just because we are unwilling to challenge received opinion? Is this dismissive stance yet another example of the human tendency to embrace dogmatism? I believe is what a student of mine had in mind as she stormed out of the classroom when I offered this sort of response to similar doubts that she had raised. I...

I agree with you that honesty in a relationship to preferable to deception, but I disagree with your suggestion that that chosing not to raise your disapproval of your boyfriend's actions amounts to a virtuous realism that acknowledges how hard it is for a committed couple to remain sexually faithful to each other. Louise's reflections on the complexity of human sexuality are excellent ones that should be of great use to you. I have three additional points to make: First, that you appreciate some of your boyfriend's actions (for example, his willingness to refrain from having sex with others when you are present) doesn't mean that you consent to his actions that you find problematical (for example, his willingess to have sex with others when you are absent). Second, that you cannot create an "abstract" argument objecting to your boyfriend's lack of sexual infidelity does not mean that you should not discuss with him what you expect in your relationship and how you experience his actions...

As Saul's response makes clear, Descartes' own reasoning seems to rely heavily on his argument for the existence of God. I think that few today would accept that argument, and so although studying Descartes closely would doubtless be interesting it may not give you a satisfactory answer to your questions. Another form of argumentation that purports to be capable of proving the existence of objects distinct from oneself is transcendental argumentation. This is most closely associated with Immanuel Kant, who developed his famous transcendental argumentation (at least in part) because he was interested in responding to problems with the rationalist philosophical tradition in which Descartes wrote and which was critiqued severely by David Hume. As interesting as Kant's argumentation is--and as fascinating as is an historical account of Kant's responses to his illustrious predecessors--Kant's own argumentation may not help you to find an answer to your question: although Kant answered your...

It is true that many types of things are repond in systematically recognizable and conistent ways to changes in their environment: including people, other animals, other types of organisms like plants, other living things like cells, and indeed non-living things like thermometers. Philosophers have paid some attention to ways that things like these are sensitive to their environment. To consider the final example, on one epistemological line it is right to say that thermometers represent the temperature because they are sensitive in this manner to changes in temperature. I don't think this position is tantamount to saying that thermometers think, but I'll leave it to partisans of that perspective to say more. One idea that rings true to me comes from the great 20th Century American philosoher Wilfrid Sellars, who drew a distinction between being "senstitive" to one's environment and being "aware" of it. In particular, it seems right to me to conclude that sensitivity plants and cells and...

My experience is that manybeginning students can learn and grow a lot by engaging intensively with primary texts. This engagement is difficult for students and their instructors, but when it occurs it is extremely intellectually rewarding. One of my earliest memories of a student was sitting alone in my college's library reading Hobbes. At one point, I "got it" and began to slow down and think hard and gain a lot from thinking about his ideas and arguments. Another was spending most of a semester discussing one single article--Quine's "Two Dogmas"--with an instrutor who was willing to throw the course syllabus out of the window and discuss those ideas as deeply and for as long as his students wanted. These were both extremely powerful experiences to me, and to my they represent a form of of "deep enagement" that still means a lot of me two decades later. As an eductator, it excites me to help students to learn how to achieve this kind of philosophical engagement, and I think that many...

My sense is that distrust of online learning has faded signficantly overall, andthat suspicion about this type of education ("loathing" seems toostrong, at least in my experience) among philosophers has eased somewhat in recent years. Thatsaid, I think you are right to suggest that relatively few philosophers areinterested in teaching exclusively online courses; there is, however,increasing interest among philospohers I talk to aobut "blended" modalities that combine face-to-faceand online learning. I agree with you and with Allen that there is no good reason whymore philospohy courses could not be taught online. I would also arguethat there is great benefit in doing so: as you suggest, online coursesprovide an excellent opportunity toextend the benefits of higher education to folks who are not wellserved by traditional classes. So, I hope that morephilosophers will be willing to "try out" online courses so that those(potential) students can benefit from all the benefits that accrue...

The answer to your first question about preconceptions is that scientists are human beings and so scientific practice is affected in many ways by human subjectivity. These effects include, but are not limited to, a human tendency towards dogmatisim. Scientific methods and training can limit the damaging effects of human dogmatism, but cannot eliminate them entirely. The answer is your second quetsion about intelligent design is that there are substantive scientific reasons for rejecting this argument for God's existence. Ironically, your assumption that scientists' failure to accept this arguments can only be due to unscientific dogmatism may be based on your own wishful or dogmatic thinking -- it is a mistake to think that the best or even the typical scientific response to the argument from design is dismissing it as a childish myth. Finally, my sense is that scientists and philosopers have explored and assessed this argument from mutliple perspectives, so I think the rational investigation...

Your question assumes that every life is worth living, and that theonly point to ending one's earthly life would be to "trade up" to apresumably better afterlife. But if one's life is so bad that it is notworth living, there is no paradox in preferring oblivion. Your exampleof a life dominated by excruciating case might be an example where somewould find life not worth living; I could imagine that slavery could sodegrade those who are enslaved that their lives seem not worth living.My sense is that the prospect of avoiding future degradation orsuffering gives suicide salience in cases like these, not just theprospect of enjoying a better afterlife. Socrates' discussion of the afterlife in Plato's Apology is a fascinting philosophical discussion of possible attitudes towards the afterlife.