The assertion that consciousness is a property of certain individuals and not others--rather than of the entire universe--implies a very special moment in the ontogeny of those individuals. This is the moment of individual consciousness origination, before which the individual (e.g., a gestating human) is not conscious, and after which it is. Would anyone disagree that this moment is implied by most theories of mind given merit in academia? By consciousness I mean nothing vague but quite simply "the subjective character of experience," a no-nonsense definition as worded by Thomas Nagel. In light of that implication, a physical theory of consciousness must either: (a) address the nature of that moment, describing a physical arrangement that gives rise spontaneously to consciousness; or (b) deny such a moment's existence and ascribe consciousness to the entire universe (some sort of pan-psychism). While (b) is typically considered the mystical and unacceptable stance, as a naturalist I find (a) to seem quite magical and have no prospect for ever finding basis in theoretical physics. Nonetheless, that special moment is implied by most philosophies of mind that I have encountered. Is there a third explanation (c) that I have not considered? Is (b) not so magical as it seems to me, and if so where is its published defense? P.S. (not necessary to post) I have very little access to philosophical resources, am only an amateur, and have searched for my answers for over a decade, so thank you for considering this problem. Please don't dodge the question with a Dan Dennettist assertion that the problem doesn't exists. There clearly is something it is like to be me, and most philosophers would assert that there is not something it is like to be a rock. Anyone who believes those two assertions DOES imply said special moment, and so the problem of explaining that moment exists. With all due respect, explain yourself, philosophy! Thank you very much, Regards, Andy